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Abstract 
This article analyses the labour market integration of newly arrived immigrants in the 
UK labour market, based on data from the UK Labour Force Survey. We focus on 
immigrants who arrived in the United Kingdom since 2000 and distinguish different 
cohorts based on the year of their arrival in the country.  We examine the extent to 
which these new arrivals were able to enter work and move up into skilled jobs, and 
analyse the sectors of the economy that have proved most amenable to this progression. 
The analysis indicates that these new arrivals fared relatively well in the workforce. In 
part as a result of their relative youth and high education levels, many new arrivals 
(especially those from the European Union and in particular the EU10 countries) moved 
straight into work.   
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Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom has long received immigrants from across the globe, but its immigrant 
population has experienced a fast growth in recent years: according to the UK Labour Force Survey, 
between 2002 and 2015, the foreign-born population increased by over 75 percent, from about 4.9 
to 8.6 million in 2015, or from 8.3 to 13.4 percent of the total population. Although the share of 
foreign-born amongst the overall population is smaller in the UK than in many other European 
countries, and the inflow of immigrants into the UK over the past one and a half decades has been 
more modest than that experienced by some other European countries (Alfano et al. 2016), the UK 
is one of the European countries where public opinion is relatively more concerned about 
immigration. Immigration has also dominated the debate that has led to the so-called Brexit 
referendum held on 23 June 2016, where concerns about migrants’ alleged over-reliance on welfare 
state provisions and little integration in the labour market were often voiced. Yet, as is often the 
case when immigration is publicly discussed, the debate was not always based on careful factual 
analysis, but firmly-held convictions informed by anecdotal evidence. 
 
This article provides an overview of the labour market integration of the cohort of immigrants that 
have entered the UK between 2000 and 2012. It assesses the extent to which these new arrivals 
were able to enter work and move up into skilled jobs, and surveys the sectors of the economy that 
have proven most amenable to this progression. In particular, we will study their integration in 
terms of employment probability, occupational distribution and sectors of occupations relative to 
those of UK-born natives. 
 
The analysis is based on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly sample survey of about 
60,000 households conducted by the Office for National Statistics. The LFS is the largest and 
longest-standing nationally representative continuous survey available in the UK. However, the 
LFS has not been especially designed for the study of immigration. Therefore, the number of 
sampled immigrants is relatively small, as it reflects the proportion of immigrants in the total 
population. The limited sample size prevents a too fine breakdown of the sample across industry-
occupation-country of origin lines.  
 
In this article we will use the LFS for the years 2000-2012, pooling together all quarters within each 
year (i.e. using all available quarters, rather than focusing on one only quarter per year) to increase 
the sample size. Throughout the report “immigrants” are defined as “foreign-born,” and “recent” 
immigrants are those who arrived in the United Kingdom since 2000.,. The EU10 refers to the 
Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004, the so-called “A8 
countries”, namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia, or in 2007, namely Bulgaria and Romania, the A2 countries. We will always compare 
three groups, based on individuals’ country of birth: natives, European Economic Area (EEA) 
immigrants (including from Switzerland), non-EEA immigrants. 1 We restrict our sample to the 
working age (18-64) population only, and focus in particular on immigrants arrived in the UK since 
2000. Additionally, the study assesses outcomes for five cohorts arriving between 2000 and 2009, 
separated according to their years of arrival in the United Kingdom. The first cohort are those who 
arrived between 2000-01; the second cohort from 2002-03; and so on. We classify occupations 
                                                 
1
 EEA countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. In the analysis we include 
Switzerland in this group because, although not being formally part of the EEA, it is linked to the EU by a series of 
bilateral agreements. 
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based on the Standard Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC 2000), and sectors of activity based 
on the Standard Industrial Classification 1992 (SIC). 2  
 
Figure 1 – Working age immigrants as a share of total UK population, 2000-2012
 
Source: Author’s analysis based on UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
 
Immigration in the UK 
 
Immigration to the UK has increased considerably over the last decade or so: the working age (18-
64) foreign-born population has grown by over 70 percent between 2000 and 2012, from about 3.5 
to 6 million in 2012, or from 9.7 percent to 15.6 percent of the total working age population (see 
Figure 1). 
 
While the UK has historically been the destination of immigrants from all origins, one of the key 
defining moments of the recent British migration history has been the EU eastern enlargement of 
2004. The UK, like Ireland and Sweden but unlike the other EU member countries, imposed 
virtually no restrictions to the access of citizens of the new member states (which came to be 
collectively called A8 countries) to its labour market. The years following the EU enlargement saw 
therefore a rise in immigration from A8 countries: as Figure 1 shows, between 2006 and 2007 alone 
the stock of immigrants from EEA countries increased by about one percent of the size of the 
working age population.3 Some studies have focused on the consequences of such immigration 
inflows for UK natives, and  found no sign of any adverse effects on public finances (see Dustmann 
et al.2010; Dustmann and Frattini 2014) and on natives’ labour market prospects (see Lemos and 
Portes 2008; Alfano et al. 2016 provide a concise review). In this article we focus instead on the 
                                                 
2
 Note that the classifications of both occupations and sectors adopted in the UK LFS have changed over time. In 
particular, occupations were coded according to SOC90 until year 2000, according to SOC2000 between years 2001 
and 2010, and according to SOC2010 since 2011. We use the double coding of occupations in both SOC2000 and 
SOC2010 available in the LFS quarters 1-3 for year 2010 to map all 4-digits SOC2010 categories in years 2011 and 
2012 into SOC2000. We instead exclude from the occupational analysis year 2000.  
Industrial sectors were coded according to SIC92 until 2006. Since 2007 industrial sectors are coded according to 
SIC2007. However, the LFS also reports a conversion variable that allows mapping SIC2007 into SIC92 for all 
quarters. 
3
 The labour market integration of A8 immigrants has been studied by Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich (2009). 
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immigrants’ experience, and provide an overview of the integration of the recent cohorts of 
immigrants in the UK labour market. 
  
Table 1 – Characteristics of recent UK immigrants and natives, 2000-2012. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Average 
age 
Share 
Women 
Share high 
education 
Share low 
education 
Share high 
education 
(25-35) 
Share low 
education 
(25-35) 
Natives 40.8 0.50 0.16 0.52 0.26 0.43 
       
Recent immigrants: 
      
EEA 30.6 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.51 0.07 
EU10 30.4 0.50 0.37 0.09 0.47 0.07 
Other EEA 31.0 0.51 0.49 0.11 0.61 0.08 
Non-EEA 32.2 0.50 0.42 0.14 0.51 0.12 
       
Arrival cohorts: 
      
2000-2001 33.1 0.50 0.40 0.16 0.46 0.15 
2002-2003 32.3 0.50 0.41 0.14 0.49 0.12 
2004-2005 31.7 0.49 0.42 0.11 0.51 0.08 
2006-2007 30.8 0.50 0.43 0.10 0.55 0.08 
2008-2009 29.5 0.49 0.41 0.10 0.55 0.08 
 
Table 1 reports some summary characteristics of recent immigrants to the UK, and compares them      
to natives.  Recent immigrants are substantially younger than natives: EEA, and especially EU10 
workers are especially likely to be young (with an average age of 31 and 30 respectively), while 
immigrants from outside the European Union are slightly older (32) compared to an average age of 
41 for natives. As expected, the gender composition of working age natives is balanced, with a 50 
percent of women. Perhaps less obviously, the same gender balance also applies to the recent 
cohorts of immigrants, irrespective of their origin. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 report the share of 
immigrants and natives with “High” or “Low” levels of education (we exclude individuals who are 
still in full-time education). We define as “highly educated” individuals who left full-time education 
at age 21 or later, and as “low educated” individuals who left full-time education before 17. 
Although this is admittedly an imperfect measure of education - which, for instance, does not allow 
for country differences in school starting age or in the number of years of high school -, it is the best 
available source of information on immigrants’ education in the UK LFS, for most of the period 
covered in the analysis. Until the end of 2010, in fact, the UK LFS was recording all foreign 
educational qualifications as “other qualifications” which makes it problematic to compare 
immigrants’ and natives’ educational levels until then.4 According to this definition, the educational 
level of recent immigrants is significantly higher than that of natives. The share of highly educated 
individuals is higher than 40percent for both EEA and non-EEA immigrants, but it stands at 16 
percent for UK natives. Further, the share of individuals with “low” education is 52 percent among 
natives, but just 9 percent and 14 percent among recent EEA and non-EEA immigrants, 
respectively. Note that the educational advantage of immigrants is not only due to the different age 
composition of the native and immigrant populations: even within the age bracket 25-35 the share 
of highly educated is 26 percent among natives but 51 percent for recent EEA and non-EEA 
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 For a discussion of this issue see the Appendix of Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012). 
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immigrants, and the share of low educated individuals is 43 percent among natives but 7 percent 
and 12 percent for recent EEAs and non-EEAs. 
 
Employment 
 
In 2012 the employment rate (ratio of the number of employed to the working age population) of 
immigrants was 68 percent, while the employment rate of natives was higher at 73 percent. 
However, stark differences exist in the immigrant population: EEA immigrants’ employment rate is 
higher than natives’ at 76 percent, while the employment rate of non-EEA is less than 64 percent. 
Immigrants are also characterized by a higher inactivity rate (ratio of the number of people out of 
the labour market to working age population) than natives: 25 percent vs. 21 percent, respectively. 
EEA immigrants display a higher labour market integration than natives, with a inactivity rate of 18 
percent, while non-EEA immigrants have a higher rate of inactivity at 29 percent.  
 
How do recently arrived immigrants fare, relative to natives and to the whole immigrant 
population? Figure 2 reports the evolution of the employment rate of natives and immigrants arrived 
since 2000 over time. 
Figure 2 - Employment rate 
 
 
The employment rate of natives is relatively stable at about 75 percent, although it drops to around 
73 percent after 2008, as a consequence of the economic crisis. The employment rate of recent 
immigrants on the contrary increases substantially over time. Non-EEA immigrants, in particular, 
start off with a substantially lower employment rate than natives, but then both immigrant groups 
experience a similar growth in employment probability which peaks in 2006-2008, and then slightly 
decreases when the economic crisis starts. 
 
In Figure 3 we display separately the evolution over time of the employment rate of immigrants 
arrived in 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007 and 2008-2009. 
The graph shows clearly that successive immigrant cohorts perform increasingly better – in terms of 
their employment probability - in the UK labour market upon arrival, but this regularity breaks 
down with the 2006-07 cohort which has a very similar performance to the previous cohort , and 
with the 2008-09 cohort, which performs consistently worse. After one year in the UK the 
employment rate of immigrants arrived in 2000-2001 was 59 percent, while it was 63 percent for 
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those arrived in 2002-2003, 70 percent for those arrived in 2004-2005 and in 2006-2007; conversely 
the employment rate after one year in the UK of immigrants arrived in 2008-2009, i.e. when the 
crisis started, was only 58.5 percent. Further, all cohorts display an increase in their employment 
probability with time spent in the UK, and the pace of such an increase (i.e. the slope of the lines in 
Figure 3) is very similar across cohorts, with the partial exception of the most recent arrivals. We 
should also note that, in the absence of a longitudinal sample, we are not able to disentangle the 
fraction of increase in employment which is due to labour market assimilation from the fraction due 
to negatively selected return migration.5 
 
Figure 3 - Employment rate by entry cohort 
 
 
What would be the difference between the employment rate of recent cohorts of immigrants and 
natives, if they were similar in terms of gender composition, age structure, and education? We 
address this question through the use of regression analysis, which allows us to compare immigrants 
and natives with the same characteristics.6  
 
 
Table 2 reports differences in employment probability between recent immigrants and natives over 
the years 2000-2012, where immigrants and natives are made increasingly similar as we move 
across columns from A to D. In column A we compare immigrants and natives within the same 
observation year: this allows us to make sure that differences in business cycle over the 13 years 
considered do not drive the results. EEA immigrants are on average 5 percentage points more likely 
than natives to be employed, while the employment probability of non-EEAs is 13 percentage point 
lower. In column B we compare natives and immigrants with the same gender: the results are 
                                                 
5
 If the least successful migrants leave the UK earlier than those who have a better labour market performance, then the 
positive slope of the employment assimilation profile might not entirely be due to the fact that immigrants with a longer 
residence in the UK are more likely to find (and retain) a job, but also to the fact that immigrants who do not find a job 
leave the country and thus mechanically increase the fraction of employed individuals among the resident immigrant 
population. 
6
 Specifically, results in table 2 are obtained from estimation of linear probability models where the dependent variable 
is a dummy for employment, and the regressors of interest are dummy variables for recent EEA and non-EEA 
immigrants (Panel I), or dummy variables for immigrants in successive immigrant cohorts (Panel II). In different 
specifications we increasingly include as additional regressors: year dummies (column A), gender (column B), a 
quadratic form in age (column C), dummies for three levels of education (column D). We estimate robust standard 
errors, and all displayed coefficients are statistically significant at 1 percent. 
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almost identical to those of column A. This is not surprising as Table 1 shows that the gender 
composition of recent immigrants and natives is very similar. However, Table 1 also shows that 
recent immigrants are younger and better educated than natives. What happens if we make EEAs 
and non-EEAs identical to natives with respect to age, on top of gender? Column C shows that this 
worsens the employment outcomes of both immigrant groups relative to natives: recent EEA 
immigrants with the same gender-age profile of natives are in every given year only less than one 
percentage point more likely than their native counterparts of having a job, while for non-EEA 
immigrants the employment gap increases to 18 percentage points. Finally, in column D we 
compare natives to recent immigrants with the same gender-age-education profile: the outcome is 
strikingly different from the unconditional comparison. A recent EEA immigrant is almost 2 
percentage point less likely to have a job than a comparable native, while the gap in employment 
probability for non-EEA recent immigrants increases to 18 percentage points.  
 
Table 2 - Differences in employment probability between natives and "similar" immigrants 
 Immigrants and natives made similar in terms of: 
 A B C D 
 
Observation 
year A + gender B + age C + education 
Panel I: by origin 
EEA 0.047 0.048 0.009 -0.017 
Non-EEA -0.130 -0.129 -0.176 -0.184 
Panel II: by arrival cohorts: 
2000-2001 -0.097 -0.095 -0.145 -0.163 
2002-2003 -0.068 -0.067 -0.115 -0.128 
2004-2005 -0.023 -0.023 -0.068 -0.084 
2006-2007 -0.039 -0.038 -0.077 -0.093 
2008-2009 -0.147 -0.146 -0.178 -0.166 
 
Overall, panel I of  
Table 2 indicates therefore that the employment probability advantage of EEA immigrants relative 
to natives is entirely due to their younger age and higher education, while the employment gap of 
non-EEA immigrants would be even larger were it not for their favourable education-age profiles. 
This finding of a persistent gap for non-European immigrants can be traced down to the lower 
portability of their human capital (Friedberg 2000): existing  levels  of  education,  experience  and  
training  can be less valued  in  the  UK labour market for non-European than for European 
immigrants. However, since many of the non-EEA immigrants have a different ethnic origin from 
UK natives, we cannot rule out that ethnic discrimination (Becker, 1971; Cain, 1986) may also  play  
a  role. Indeed, there is evidence for the UK labour market that non-white immigrants have 
important labour market penalties, in terms of both lower wages and lower employment rates, even 
after  accounting  for  a  standard  range  of  personal  and  work-related  characteristics (Wheatley  
Price,  2001; Blackaby et al. 2002; Clark and Lindley 2009). 
 
In panel II of  
Table 2 we report a similar analysis for the five cohorts of immigrants arrived between 2000 and 
2009 which have been previously studied. As expected, the gap in employment probability between 
immigrants in each cohort and natives increases as immigrants are made “more similar” to natives. 
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Interestingly, however, the relative stand of each cohort relative to the others is not affected by the 
age-distribution profiles of its members, with the 2004-05 cohort having the lowest employment 
probability gap from natives in every year, and the 2008-2009 cohort having the highest. The 
differences in gaps between cohorts are however lower when differences in gender-age-education 
profiles are taken into account. 
 
Occupational distribution 
 
Employment is only one dimension of labour market integration. Another important dimension in 
evaluating the role of immigrants in the UK labour market is to analyse their occupational 
distribution, compared to that of natives. Table 3 reports the occupational distribution of immigrants 
and natives in 2012, where occupations are grouped in the nine SOC major groups. Occupations’ 
grouping is designed to reflect the general level of qualifications, training, skills and experience 
commonly associated with the competent performance of work tasks in each group. Occupations are 
ranked in decreasing level of skills required in each occupation. The last column reports the median 
hourly pay in each occupation over the period 2000-2012, expressed in 2005£UK. Immigrants are 
66 percent more likely than natives to be employed in elementary occupations, the least-skilled and 
least-paid occupational category. On the other hand, the proportion of immigrants in the highest-
paid occupational category, professional occupations, is higher (16.5 percent) than that of natives 
(13 percent). Immigrants’ occupational distribution tends therefore to be U-shaped, with a higher 
concentration at the top and at the bottom of the occupational scale. Non-EEA immigrants tend to 
have better occupational outcomes than EEAs, as they are less likely to be employed in elementary 
occupations (13 percent vs. 23 percent) and more likely to be employed in high-skill and high-pay 
occupations. The occupational distribution of recent immigrants is similar to that of the overall 
immigrant population, although they are more concentrated in low-skilled occupations and slightly 
less concentrated in more skilled occupational categories. In order to understand whether their 
lower occupational performance is due to some unfavourable characteristics of recent immigrant 
cohorts, or simply due to a shorter residence in the UK, in Figure 4 we look at the evolution of the 
share of immigrants in unskilled occupations for recent immigrant cohorts over time.7 
 
Table 3 - Occupational distribution of Immigrants and Natives, 2012 
 
Natives 
 
Immigrants Recent Immigrants Median 
hourly 
pay All EEA 
Non-
EEA EEA Non-EEA 
Managers and Senior 
Officials 0.158 0.135 0.122 0.142 0.076 0.124 14.1 
Professional occupations 0.131 0.165 0.132 0.185 0.100 0.183 15.0 
Associate Professional 
and Technical 0.162 0.148 0.127 0.162 0.107 0.160 11.3 
Administrative and 
Secretarial 0.116 0.073 0.065 0.079 0.054 0.062 7.8 
Skilled Trades 
Occupations 0.107 0.085 0.111 0.070 0.126 0.065 8.3 
Personal Service 
Occupations 0.089 0.083 0.066 0.093 0.057 0.111 6.4 
Sales and Customer 
Service Occupations 0.076 0.062 0.047 0.072 0.052 0.080 5.7 
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 It is also important to note the role that qualifications plays in the distribution of immigrants across occupations as 
many immigrants have found that qualifications obtained outside the UK are not initially, at least, recognised within the 
UK (see Rolfe’s paper in this issue) 
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Process, Plant and 
Machine Operatives 0.062 0.082 0.104 0.069 0.135 0.057 7.3 
Elementary Occupations 0.099 0.166 0.227 0.129 0.293 0.158 5.7 
 
 
Figure 4 - Elementary occupations by entry cohort 
 
 
The proportion of individuals in elementary occupations upon arrival in the UK is lowest for 
immigrants arrived in 2000-2001 (20 percent), but it increases steadily over successive cohorts up 
to 33 percent for the 2008-2009 arrival cohort. Moreover, for all cohorts the proportion of employed 
individuals in elementary occupations decreases over time. 
 
It is worth noting that Figure 4 looks very similar to the mirror image of Figure 3, which suggests 
that the occupational distribution may have to do with selective labour market participation: earlier 
cohorts have lower employment rates, but better occupational outcomes than more recent cohorts. 
It has been recorded (e.g. Dustmann et al. 2013) that recent cohorts of immigrants in the UK suffer 
an “occupational downgrading”, i.e. they tend to be employed in occupations for which they are 
over-qualified (see also the related literature on the ethnic penalty, e.g. Heath and McMahon 1997; 
Berthoud 2000; Heath and Cheung 2006; Simpson et al.2006). The analysis of  
Table 4, which is similar to  
Table 2 on employment probability, allows us to address this issue.8 
 
Column A of  
Table 4 shows that in every year recent EEA immigrants are 19 percentage points more likely than 
natives to be employed in elementary occupations, while the probability gap is of seven percentage 
points for recent non-EEA immigrants. As expected, column B shows that this difference does not 
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 Results in table 4 are obtained from estimation of linear probability models similar to those in Table 2, but where the 
dependent variable is a dummy for being employed in an elementary occupation, and the sample consists of all 
individuals in employment. See footnote 6 for details. 
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arise because of dissimilarities in gender composition between immigrants and natives. Rather, part 
of the higher probability of falling in the lowest skilled occupational category can be explained, for 
recent EEA immigrants, by their younger age: when we compare similarly-aged natives and recent 
immigrants the likelihood of being employed in elementary occupations decreases to 18.5 
percentage points for EEAs, while it is essentially unaffected for non-EEAs. When we compare 
recent immigrants and natives that are similar also in terms of education, however, the gap increases 
for all immigrant groups: a recent EEA (non-EEA) immigrant is 23 (11) percentage points more 
likely to be employed in an elementary occupation than a native with the same gender-age-
education profile. The table confirms therefore the existence of a substantial occupational 
downgrading of recent immigrants in the UK labour market. 
 
Table 4 - Differences in probability of being in elementary occupations 
 Immigrants and natives made similar in terms of: 
 A B C D 
 
Observation 
year A + gender B + age C + education 
Panel I: by origin 
EEA 0.193 0.192 0.185 0.228 
Non-EEA 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.107 
Panel II: by arrival cohorts 
2000-2001 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.089 
2002-2003 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.113 
2004-2005 0.137 0.137 0.134 0.177 
2006-2007 0.180 0.180 0.173 0.216 
2008-2009 0.194 0.194 0.184 0.220 
 
Panel II of  
Table 4 indicates that all recent cohorts of immigrants suffer some occupational downgrading, as 
for all cohorts the difference in probability of being in employed in an elementary occupation with 
respect to a native is higher when their education is taken into account. The downgrading is higher 
for more recent arrival cohorts, which are more likely than earlier cohorts of working in unskilled 
occupations despite their higher level of education (see Table 1). 
 
Sectoral distribution 
 
Finally, we analyse the distribution of employed immigrants and natives across SIC sectors. There 
are no major differences in the sector of activity of natives and of immigrants in general, although 
immigrants tend to be more concentrated than natives in the sectors of distribution, hotels and 
restaurants, in transport and communications and in banking, as we show in  
Table 5. 
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Table 5- Sector distribution of Immigrants and Natives, 2012 
 
Natives 
Immigrants Recent 
Immigrants 
Proportion of jobs that 
are 
All EEA Non-EEA EEA 
Non-
EEA 
High 
skilled Low skilled 
Agriculture and 
fishing 0.016 0.008 0.017 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.126 0.238 
Energy and water 0.014 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.432 0.245 
Manufacturing 0.110 0.101 0.148 0.072 0.179 0.073 0.334 0.291 
Construction 0.075 0.054 0.083 0.036 0.093 0.038 0.213 0.161 
Distribution, hotels 
and restaurants 0.181 0.220 0.215 0.224 0.245 0.229 0.256 0.481 
Transport and 
communication 0.058 0.078 0.070 0.082 0.080 0.065 0.235 0.478 
Banking, finance and 
insurance 0.174 0.213 0.205 0.218 0.192 0.242 0.553 0.139 
Public administration, 
education and health 0.308 0.267 0.197 0.310 0.135 0.294 0.494 0.075 
Other services 0.064 0.053 0.057 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.390 0.175 
 
Some differences are evident instead between the sectors of employment of EEA and non-EEA 
immigrants: EEAs are twice as likely as non-EEAs to be employed in manufacturing (15 percent vs. 
7 percent) and construction (8 percent vs. 4 percent), while non-EEAs have a substantially higher 
concentration than EEAs in public administration, education and health (31 percent vs. 20 percent). 
 
When we restrict the attention to immigrants arrived since 2000, some more differences emerge 
between immigrants and natives, and between natives of different origins. Recent EEA immigrants 
are ten times more likely than non-EEAs to work in agriculture (2 percent vs. 0.2 percent), and are 
more concentrated in manufacturing (18 percent) and in hotels and restaurants (24.5 percent) than 
earlier immigrants. Recent immigrants from all origins are less likely to work in banking and 
finance and in public administration, education and health – the sectors with the highest 
concentration of high skilled jobs,9 as indicated in the last two columns of the table - than earlier 
immigrants. 
 
                                                 
9
 We have grouped into “high skill” occupations SOC major groups 1, 2 and 3 (Managers and Senior Officials; 
Professional occupations; Associate Professional and Technical), and into “low skill” occupations SOC major groups 7, 
8 and 9 (Sales and Customer Service Occupations; Process, Plant and Machine Operatives; Elementary Occupations). 
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Figure 5 - Sectorial concentration over time, 2000-2001 entry cohort 
 
 
In Figure 5 we focus on the cohort of immigrants who arrived in the UK between 2000 and 2001, 
and show how their concentration in some of the most immigrant-intensive sectors evolves with 
time spent in the UK. The figure shows that the proportion of immigrants employed in distribution, 
hotels, and restaurants fluctuates over time but remains relatively constant at just above 20 percent. 
Conversely, the proportion of immigrant workers in manufacturing exhibits a clear downward trend, 
decreasing from 10.5 percent in 2002 to 7 percent in 2012, while the share of workers in 
construction increases slightly over time, from 3 percent to 5 percent. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The United Kingdom has experienced a sizeable growth in its foreign-born population since 2000. 
Newcomers are younger and better-educated than UK natives, but they are characterized by a 
lower probability of employment and a higher concentration in unskilled occupations, especially 
in the first years after moving, though there is a strong variation across sub-groups. This indicates 
that the labour market integration of recent arrivals tends to improve with time spent in the United 
Kingdom, a pattern that is common to all recent entry cohorts in terms of both employment 
probability and occupational upgrading.10 EEA workers have better labour market outcomes than 
those from non-EEA countries, and they also have a higher employment probability than natives, 
after some time spent in the UK. 
 
Some commentators have voiced criticism about the British decision in 2004 to refrain from 
imposing restrictions on workers from Eastern Europe, resulting in a significant influx of new 
workers. Some communities which received large numbers of EU10 workers, particularly in some 
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 We should, however interpret these findings with some caution because, in the absence of longitudinal data, we cannot disentangle 
the effect of labor market assimilation from selective return migration. 
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northern and/or rural areas, were unaccustomed to immigration and unprepared for it, resulting in 
some pressure on public services—and, in some cases, negative public attitudes, especially when 
change was rapid. The sources of public anxiety are many, ranging from fear about competition for 
jobs, to a sense of unfairness about these workers’ eligibility for social benefits, to concern on their 
behalf about working conditions and exploitation. Public concerns about the scale of immigration 
from the countries which joined the EU in 2004 led the UK government to impose restrictions on 
immigration of citizens of Bulgaria and Romania. These restrictions were eventually lifted only in 
January 2014, amidst fears of a rapid rise in immigration from these countries.  
 
Despite these worries, the employment rates of EU10 workers are the highest of newcomers of all 
backgrounds. The findings of this article suggest that these outcomes are largely the result of this 
population’s favourable age and education profile, which indicates that the UK, in contrast to other 
European countries, is able to attract a favourably self-selected immigrant population, even from 
EU countries, from which immigration cannot be selective. 
 
These workers are also overrepresented in unskilled jobs. However, as new immigrants spend time 
in the country, and learn relevant country-specific skills, most notably the language, they tend to 
move up the occupational ladder. The policy challenge in this case is to avoid a situation where a 
long stay in unskilled occupations may lead to a depreciation of immigrants’ human capital, thus 
wasting a precious and freely-available resource.   
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